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FROM STOREFRONT TO DASHBOARD: THE USE OF 
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT TO 
GOVERN WEBSITES 
Kelby Carlson 
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, approximately one-fifth of the United 
States population has at least one disability.1  The year 2018 marks the twenty-
eighth year since Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),2 
and since then, society has been reshaped dramatically by the Internet, which 
officially came into existence shortly before the ADA.3  Within several years of 
the enactment of the ADA, the Internet became the subject of litigation by people 
with disabilities. 
Title III of the ADA governs “places of public accommodation,” which the 
ADA enumerates at some length,4 and applies to privately owned entities.  
Although it contains no direct or unambiguous language concerning the 
Internet,5 it was not long before the notion of “place” came up for review in the 
courts.  The earliest discussion of this issue was in Carparts Distribution Center, 
Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New England, Inc.6  In that case, the 
First Circuit held that an insurance carrier who provided its services via the 
Internet was a place of public accommodation, even though its service was not 
directly provided at a physical location.7  In doing so, the court took a broad 
interpretation of the ADA’s definition of a public accommodation, construing it 
to apply not only to physical structures but also to provisionary services to which 
the public had equal access.8 
Other courts interpreted the ADA in a stricter fashion.  In 1997, the Sixth 
Circuit dismissed the plaintiff’s case in Parker v. Metropolitan Life Insurance 
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 1. As of 2010, this number was approximately 19%, with half of the disabled respondents 
reporting a “severe” disability.  Nearly One in Five People Have a Disability in the US, Census 
Bureau Reports, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU (Jul. 25, 2012), https://www.census.gov/new 
sroom/releases/archives/miscellaneous/cb12-134.html. 
 2. 42 U.S.C § 12101 (2009). 
 3. Tim Berners-Lee, The World Wide Web: Past, Present and Future, WORLD WIDE WEB 
CONSORTIUM (Aug. 1996), https://www.w3.org/People/Berners-Lee/1996/ppf.html. 
 4. See id. 
 5. 42 U.S.C § 12181(7)(A)–(L) (2014). 
 6. 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994). 
 7. Id. at 19. 
 8. Id. 
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Co.,9 holding that the ADA only governed physical locations.10  The circuits 
split over the next few years: the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits tended to interpret 
the ADA narrowly, ruling for defendants, while the First and Ninth Circuits 
construed the ADA broadly, finding it governed more than just physical 
locations, and, therefore, ruled for plaintiffs.11  These splits continued when 
plaintiffs began bringing suits against entities based on the lack of accessibility 
of electronic communications12 and websites on the Internet.  For instance, in 
2006, the Ninth Circuit, in an issue of first impression in National Federation of 
the Blind v. Target Corp.,13 ruled that a retailer’s website was a place of public 
accommodation because it provided indirect access to the store itself and, 
therefore, was governed by Title III of the ADA.14  Over the next decade, 
litigants continued to dispute the definition of “place of public accommodation” 
and courts continued to diverge in their holdings. 
This Comment argues that courts and scholars have given insufficient 
attention to the concept of place.  Place means more than simply “a discrete 
physical location.”  The law, far from being a structural entity that forms ex 
nihilo, arises in part out of human language, which in turn arises from human 
experience.  This Comment offers evidence that both the average person and the 
court should conceive of “place” in a broad sense.  To do so, this Comment 
draws on jurisprudence outside the field of disability law, namely the realms of 
trespass and search-and-seizure. 
Part I provides an overview of the text and legislative history of the ADA, 
along with varying case law which treats non-physical spaces as places of public 
accommodation.  Part II analyzes philosophy and legal scholarship on the 
interpretation of place as a nonphysical concept and surveys different solutions 
to the problem of websites as public accommodation under the ADA.  
Additionally, this Comment demonstrates that law applicable to the Internet 
outside the context of the ADA, such as courts’ rulings on Internet searches and 
seizures under the Fourth Amendment and trespass to chattels under tort law, 
has been applied to the Internet already and consistently treats the Internet in the 
same manner it does a physical location.  Finally, Part III points to the 
Department of Justice’s potential recognition of this fact as they prepare to apply 
the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines 2.0 to publicly-operated websites 
under Title II of the ADA, and argues that it should do likewise to Title III. 
                                                 
 9. 121 F.3d 1006, 1019 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 10. Id. at 1022 (Martin, B., dissenting). 
 11. See generally infra Part A (discussing how Courts from various circuits determine what 
is a place and why this distinction is significant). 
 12. See Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279, 1280 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 13. 452 F. Supp. 2d 946 (N. D. Cal. 2006). 
 14. Id. at 956. 
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I. GOING PLACES: COURTS INTERPRET “PLACE” AND WHY IT MATTERS 
A. Enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act 
Until 1990, the most important predecessor of the ADA was Section 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“the Act”).15  While the Act made steps toward 
ensuring federal rights for people with disabilities, the language of the Act 
primarily encompassed federal programs, and, therefore was not as effective as 
disability activists hoped it would be.16  During the Reagan administration, some 
disability lobbyists sought to classify “disability” as a right under the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 while others argued a separate act would accomplish more 
because disability rights concerned specific matters.17  By 1990, lobbyists 
convinced Congress to enact the ADA, the most comprehensive American law 
aimed at protecting the rights of people with disabilities, and encouraging them 
to flourish publicly.18 
Legislative history confirms that Congress sought to provide a national 
mandate that would improve the lives of the disabled.19  According to Congress, 
a primary purpose of the law was to curb discrimination against the disabled.20  
Congress stated that discrimination encompassed “segregation, exclusion, or 
other denial of benefits, services, or opportunities to people with disabilities that 
are as effective and meaningful as those provided to others.”21  Discrimination, 
                                                 
 15. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–797. (2012). 
 16. For the primary example, Section 794 of the statute reads: 
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in 
Section 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from 
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or 
activity conducted by any executive agency or by the United States Postal Service. 
Id. § 794. 
 17. DORIS AMES FLEISCHER & FRIEDA AMES, THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT: FROM 
CHARITY TO CONFRONTATION 89 (2001). 
 18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012). 
 19. The introduction to the House Report for the enacted law states that the purpose of the 
ADA is: 
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities; (2) to provide clear, strong, 
consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities; (3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing 
the standards established in this Act on behalf the individuals with disabilities; and (4) 
to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the 
fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major areas 
of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities. 
H.R. Rep. 101-485(II), pt.2 at 329 (1990). 
 20. Id. at 274. 
 21. Id. at 29. 
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moreover, can arise either through design or by effect; it can be the result of 
intent or “thoughtlessness.”22 
Specifically, Congress found that discrimination occurred in areas such as 
“public transportation, public services, and telecommunications.”23  In 
addressing the isolation many of the disabled experience due to discrimination, 
Congress noted that many people with disabilities do not attend movies, sporting 
events, the theater, restaurants, grocery stores, or churches,24  because of  
transportation, architecture, or communications barriers to intent, entry, or 
participation.25 
In an effort to overcome such discrimination, Congress enacted the ADA, 
thereby legislating the removal of barriers to public participation of the disabled, 
both socially and vocationally.26  In the ADA, Congress defines a disability as 
“a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life 
activities of such individual.”27  The conception of a major life activity is quite 
broad, but encompasses many of the standard activities one would engage in 
frequently, such as attending church or visiting a grocery store.28  
There are several titles of the ADA.  Title II governs the practices of 
governmental organizations,29 while Title III, which this Comment addresses, 
governs employers and places of public accommodation.30  According to title III 
of the ADA, “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of 
disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public 
accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a 
place of public accommodation.”31  Congress included a wide spectrum of 
entities under the umbrella of a public accommodation, such as auditoriums, 
private schools, grocery stores, public transportation, theaters, and other places 
of entertainment.32  The ADA provides that discrimination encompasses denial 
                                                 
 22. Id.  Congress also refers to the lack of careful design without the intent to discriminate as 
“benign neglect.”  Id. 
 23. H.R. Rep. 101-485(II), pt.2 at 329 (1990). 
 24. Id. at 34. 
 25. Id. at 35.  These findings came from testimony of numerous people with disabilities, 
compiled in a report by the National Council on Disability.  Id. at 34. 
 26. Id. at 22–23. 
 27. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2012). 
 28. A major life activity can include “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, 
hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, 
concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working” as well as the use of any major bodily 
function.  Id. § 12102(2)(A)–(B). 
 29. Id. § 12131. 
 30. Id. § 12181. 
 31. Id. § 12182(a). 
 32. The comprehensive list is laid out in 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A)–(L) as follows: 
(A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging, except for an establishment located 
within a building that contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and that is 
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of participation in a public accommodation or participation on unequal 
grounds.33 
B. Pre-Internet Approaches to the Question of Place 
Because of the statute’s expansiveness, it took time for the courts to begin to 
address what could be classified as a place of public accommodation beyond the 
statute.  Other examinations of the applicability of the statute have neglected to 
examine several pre-Internet cases interpreting Sections 12181 and 12182, 
which shed important light on the courts’ possible approaches. 
The first case to extensively address this question was Carparts Distribution 
Center, Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New England, Inc.34  The First 
Circuit heard the case on appeal after the district court dismissed it under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.35  The plaintiff, Ronald Senter, was diagnosed 
with HIV in 1986 and with AIDS in 1991; he died in 1993.36  Senter was a 
member of a health plan offered by the defendant, who, in 1991 announced that 
it would limit benefits to AIDS patients to $25,000; general patients received  $1 
million in coverage.37  The plaintiff alleged, both to the district court and to the 
First Circuit on appeal, that the defendant, knew he had been diagnosed with 
                                                 
actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as the residence of such 
proprietor; 
(B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink; 
(C) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of exhibition 
or entertainment; 
(D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of public gathering; 
(E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping center, or other 
sales or rental establishment; 
(F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service, shoe 
repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, 
insurance office, professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service 
establishment; 
(G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public transportation; 
(H) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or collection; 
(I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation; 
(J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate private school, or 
other place of education; 
(K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank, adoption 
agency, or other social service center establishment; and 
(L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of exercise or 
recreation. 
 33. Id. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). 
 34. 37 F.3d 12, 19–20 (1st Cir. 1997) (discussing the definition of “place of 
accommodation”). 
 35. Id. at 14 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) as a basis for dismissal of the suit on a failure to 
state a claim). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
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AIDS, instituted the new policy, and failed to provide him with standard benefits 
outside the purview of that policy.38  He brought suit contending that this policy 
violated both a state discrimination statute and the ADA.39  The district court 
interpreted a public accommodation as applying exclusively to a physical 
structure “with definite physical boundaries which a person physically enters for 
the purpose of utilizing the facilities or obtaining services.”40  In contrast, the 
court of appeals found that the term “public accommodation” was ambiguous on 
its face.41  It went on to say, however, that the legislative history of the ADA,42 
as well as Congress’s inclusion of “travel services” in its list of public 
accommodations, suggested that the phrase “public accommodation” was meant 
to encompass more than physical structures.43  The court suggested that a legal 
outcome where, for example, a disabled customer was protected when 
purchasing services in a store but was unprotected when purchasing those same 
services over the telephone would be irrational and an “absurd result.”44  
Nevertheless, the court did not rule on the plaintiff’s claim due to the sparseness 
of the offered facts, and, instead, remanded the case to the district court for 
further proceedings.45 
The other significant pre-Internet litigation case to positively interpret the 
ADA as applying to non-physical structures was Rendon v. Valleycrest 
Productions, Ltd.46  In that case, the plaintiffs alleged that Valleycrest 
Productions and the ABC television network violated the ADA by constructing 
a phone process for participation in the quiz show “Who Wants to Be a 
Millionaire?” which screened out disabled (particularly deaf) individuals who 
wanted to participate.47  This process involved a recorded message with various 
questions to which the participants must respond by pressing keys on the 
telephone keypad within the allocated time.48  Several plaintiffs who were 
unable to participate in the process either because of upper mobility impairments 
or inability to hear the recorded questions, brought suit because there were no 
alternative services available.49  The district court granted ABC and 
Valleycrest’s motion to dismiss, finding that the ADA did not apply since the 
telephone process was not a physical location and did not qualify as a place of 
                                                 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 14–15. 
 40. Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New England, 37 F.3d 12, 18 
(1st Cir. 1994). 
 41. Id. at 19. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 20. 
 46. 294 F.3d 1279, 1280 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 47. Id. at 1281. 
 48. Id. at 1280. 
 49. Id. at 1281. 
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public accommodation.50  Defendants argued that, though their process did 
screen out people with certain disabilities, they nevertheless fell outside the 
ADA because the contestant hotline did not prevent plaintiff’s physical access 
to the location at which the services were held.51  The court found this argument 
unpersuasive; it pointed to the ADA as specifically delineating processes that 
tend to screen out disabled individuals as a form of discrimination.52  The court 
further stated that, regardless of whether it took place off-site, exclusion, done 
with the intention to screen out or reduce access for people with disabilities 
constituted prohibiting access to a public accommodation.53 
C. Courts Apply Section 12182 Exclusively to Physical Structures 
Two other circuit court cases contrast with Carparts and Rendon in their 
ruling on the definition of public accommodation under Section 12182 of the 
ADA.  The first is Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.54  In Parker, an employee 
sued her employer alleging violation of the ADA.55  The plaintiff argued that, 
because the employer’s insurance policy provided longer-term benefits to those 
who became physically disabled than to those who became mentally disabled, it 
unnecessarily restricted her access to a public accommodation.56  The District 
Court dismissed Parker’s Title III claim; on appeal, the circuit court reversed.57  
After a motion for a rehearing en banc, however, the Circuit Court reversed and 
reaffirmed the district court’s dismissal.58  The Circuit Court stated that the 
insurance policy was not offered by a place of public accommodation; Parker 
could not go to an insurance office to receive the policy, but rather obtained it 
directly from her employer.59  Furthermore, the court found that, even if the 
insurance policy was offered in a place of public accommodation, there still 
would not be a violation of the ADA.60  The court interpreted Section 12182 as 
applying to services offered by a place of public accommodation and excluding 
the contents of those services; a bookstore, therefore, must provide access to its 
books, but it is not required to stock large print or braille books.61 
                                                 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 1283. 
 52. Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279, 1285 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 53. Id. at 1286. 
 54. 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 55. Id. at 1008. 
 56. Id. at 1008–09.  The plaintiff also brought her claim under the Employment Retirement 
Income and Security Act (ERISA) and Title I of the ADA; discussion of those claims is omitted. 
 57. Id. at 1009. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 1011–12. 
 60. Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1012–13 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 61. Id. at 1012. 
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Several years later, Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.62 presented 
nearly identical circumstances to Parker.  In both cases, an employee purchased 
a group insurance policy, which offered long-term benefits to those with 
physical disabilities, but restricted benefits for mentally disabled employees to 
twenty-four months.63  The insurance company Fox patronized had a more 
extensive and more costly policy available; the plaintiff argued that Fox should 
have purchased that policy and its failure to do so constituted a violation of Title 
III of the ADA because it offered a plan that discriminated against people with 
disabilities.64  The district court granted Fox’s motion for summary judgment, 
and Weyer appealed.65  The court gave an almost identical ruling to Parker.  
First, the court held that the insurance carrier was not a place of public 
accommodation because it did not offer its services through its own physical 
locations and, therefore, there was no “nexus” between the two.66  Second, the 
court stated, as in Parker, that Congress intended for Section 12182 to govern 
the services offered by a place of public accommodation, but not the content of 
those services.67  Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of Fox’s 
motion.68 
This history is important because the subsequent application of the ADA to 
websites—or lack thereof—cannot be fully understood without this context.  
Past scholarship on this subject has generally given only cursory attention to the 
pre-Internet jurisprudence, but context always matters when presenting history 
and when advocating for a particular jurisprudential step.  Now that the 
foundation has been laid, the subsequent sections trace courts’ applications of 
the ADA to privately owned and operated websites. 
D. The ADA and the Internet Under Section 12182 
1. Access Now, Target, and the “Nexus Test” 
Eventually, courts began to address whether websites constitute public places.  
The advent of extended jurisprudence addressing the link between Title III of 
the ADA and the Internet arose in 2002, with Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest 
Airlines, Co.69  Unlike prior cases, there was no single incident of discrimination 
which resulted in the lawsuit.  Instead, Access Now, an advocacy organization 
for the disabled, and Robert Gumson, a blind individual, sought injunctive relief 
                                                 
 62. 198 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 63. Id. at 1107–08. 
 64. Id. at 1108. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 1114–15 (citing Parker, 294 F.3d at 1010–11).  The language of a “nexus” between 
a place and a nonphysical structure will become significant in this analysis. 
 67. Id. at 1115. 
 68. Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 69. 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1314 (S. D. Fla. 2002). 
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and a declaratory judgment against Southwest Airlines.70  Southwest Airlines 
was the first airline to create its own website.71  In arguing Southwest violated 
the ADA by virtue of the inaccessibility of its website, plaintiffs asserted that 
the website was unusable by individuals using a screen reader—a piece of 
assistive technology that transforms information on a screen into synthesized 
speech.72  The plaintiffs contended that, by failing to provide alternative text to 
improve the accessibility of its website and by failing to include a “skip 
navigation” link that would allow blind individuals to bypass the navigation bars 
on the website, Southwest was violating Section 12182 of the ADA.73 
In deciding whether Southwest’s website was a place of public 
accommodation under Sections 12181 and 12182, the court used the same 
standard as the court in Rendon.74  According to the court, the “first step in 
interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain 
and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.”75  
The court did not agree with plaintiff’s attempt to combine different terms in 
Section 12181— namely, “exhibition,” “display,” and “sales establishment” — 
to assert that Southwest fell under the definition of place of public 
accommodation.76  Instead, the court interpreted the statute such that  “[t]he 
general terms, “exhibition,” “display,” and “sales establishment,” are limited to 
their corresponding specifically enumerated terms, all of which are physical, 
concrete structures, namely: “motion picture house, theater, concert hall, 
stadium;” “museum, library, gallery;” and “bakery, grocery store, clothing store, 
hardware store, shopping center,” respectively.”77  The plaintiffs relied on the 
holding from Rendon to argue there was a nexus between the services Southwest 
offered on their website and the physical services offered (air travel).78  The 
court disagreed, saying: 
whereas the defendants in Rendon conceded, and the Eleventh Circuit 
agreed, that the game show at issue took place at a physical, public 
accommodation (a concrete television studio), and that the fast finger 
telephone selection process used to select contestants tended to screen 
out disabled individuals, the Internet website at issue here is neither a 
physical, public accommodation itself as defined by the ADA, nor a 
                                                 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 1315 (citing Southwest Airlines Fact Sheet, (last accessed Oct. 16, 2002), 
http://www.southwest.com/about_ swa/press /factsheet.html.). 
 72. Id. at 1316. 
 73. Id.  Travel websites can be particularly complicated for screen reader users, as their forms 
are often multi-page, contain dynamic content and sometimes require timed responses. This fact 
has not changed in the intervening years since this case. 
 74. Id. at 1317. 
 75. Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1317 (S. D. Fla. 
2002). 
 76. Id. at 1318–19. 
 77. Id. at 1319. 
 78. Id. 
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means to accessing a concrete space such as the specific television 
studio in Rendon.79 
In dismissing the claim, the court relied particularly on the convergence of (1) 
a website with (2) a verifiable, unchanging physical location not in terms of 
services but in terms of offering of services.80  The court reasoned that since a 
website did not exist in any one location, the plaintiffs could not prove a denial 
of a particular service.81  A contrasting, frequently-cited case would come four 
years later with National Federation of the Blind v. Target Corp.82 
Much like Southwest, this suit concerned the accessibility of the interface of 
a website operated by an already-existing service.83  Through Target.com, an 
individual can “access information on store locations and hours, refill a 
prescription or order photo prints for pick-up at a store, and print coupons to 
redeem at a store” as well as purchase items from the store itself.84  The plaintiffs 
stated that building an accessible website is relatively simple and not 
economically prohibitive; the primary requirements are embedded text inside 
graphics and the ability for screen readers to read navigation links.85 
The plaintiffs brought suit under several state and federal laws, 
including Title III of the ADA; the defendant then removed the case 
to federal court and filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim.86  The defendant and the plaintiff both argued, implicitly, based 
on a nexus theory.  The defendant denied discrimination, asserting that 
the inaccessibility of Target.com was not covered since the company 
was not denying access to the Target stores themselves.87  Conversely, 
the plaintiff’s argued that, because Target.com was a hub by which 
one could receive services traditionally received at physical stores—
such as refilling a prescription—the inaccessibility of Target.com was 
functionally a denial of access to the physical store as well.88 
The court addressed several of the defendant’s Title III arguments.  First, it 
held that denial of access “off-site” could still amount to discrimination if the 
service offered by the entity itself was denied or restricted.89  The court held that, 
                                                 
 79. Id. at 1321. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1321 (S. D. Fla. 
2002).  Thus, because the Internet website, southwest.com, does not exist in any particular 
geographical location, Plaintiffs are unable to demonstrate that Southwest’s website impedes their 
access to a specific, physical, concrete space such as a particular airline ticket counter or travel 
agency.  Id. 
 82. 452 F. Supp. 2d 946 (N. D. Cal. 2006). 
 83. Id. at 949–50. 
 84. Id. at 949. 
 85. Id. at 949–50. 
 86. Id. at 949–51. 
 87. Id. at 952. 
 88. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 952 (N. D. Cal. 2006). 
 89. Id. at 953. 
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to the extent that the defendant argued that the plaintiff’s claims of 
discrimination were false purely because the denial did not occur at a physical 
location, the arguments failed.90  Furthermore, the court held that, even where a 
physical location existed, denial of direct access to the physical location did not 
constitute the only ground for discrimination.91  Relying on Rendon, the court 
held that, if there was a physical location offering particular services, even if 
those services extended beyond the physical location itself, then the failure to 
maintain equal access for the disabled and nondisabled alike could constitute 
discrimination.92  Thus, it is not simply access to the physical location that must 
be equal; there must also be equal access to all of the services provided through 
or by that location.93  Courts in the Ninth Circuit have continued this line of 
thinking, repeatedly upholding the “nexus” test as recently as 2017.94 
2. After Target: Courts Address Internet-Exclusive Services—Netflix, and 
Scribd 
Eventually courts began to take on cases in which the accessibility of a service 
was not tied to any particular physical location at all.  These cases have become 
especially prevalent in light of the reality that many people now obtain certain 
goods and services exclusively via the Internet itself.  This Comment examines 
four illustrative cases, from different circuits, and their approaches to this 
question over  the last few years. 
The first case, Cullen v. Netflix, Inc.,95 was litigated in the same district as 
Target.  Netflix is a video rental service that, since 2008, has offered an 
increasing number of productions available to be streamed through its website.96  
Starting in 2009, Netflix announced plans to begin providing subtitles for their 
programming, with successive announcements indicating further 
development.97  Cullen filed a class-action lawsuit, arguing that deaf subscribers 
reasonably relied on them in purchasing their subscriptions and anticipated that 
closed captioning would be forthcoming.98  Though Cullen brought suit under 
California state law, the court’s holding is relevant because, in part of his 
argument, Cullen relied on an ADA violation which would also violate the state 
law in question.99  However, the court found no “nexus” between Netflix’s 
                                                 
 90. Id. at 953–54. 
 91. Id. at 952–55. 
 92. Id. at 953. 
 93. Id. at 953–55. 
 94. See Reed v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. CV 17-3877-MWF (SKx), 2017 WL 4457508, at 
*7 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2017). 
 95. 880 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
 96. Id. at 1020–21. 
 97. Id. at 1021. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 1023. 
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website and any particular physical location.100  Netflix offered its streaming 
service exclusively online, so the court determined that, under Target’s 
precedent, the nexus test failed and the streaming service was not a place of 
public accommodation.101 
The second case involving Netflix, National Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, 
Inc.,102 came to the opposite conclusion.  Like in Cullen, the National 
Association of the Deaf brought suit under the ADA, claiming that only a small 
number of Netflix’s shows were captioned and that Netflix failed to categorize 
accurately its captioned films, thereby prohibiting deaf individuals from making 
use of Netflix’s personalized film recommendations.103  The plaintiffs argued 
that Netflix fell under several of the examples of places of public 
accommodation in 42 U.S.C. § 12181, and thus was analogous to a regular 
physical store.104  Agreeing with the First Circuit’s decision in Carparts, the 
court said that a decision to exclude from the ADA those businesses that market 
their services via the Internet would “run afoul of the purposes of the ADA and 
would severely frustrate Congress’s intent that individuals with disabilities fully 
enjoy the goods, services, privileges and advantages, available indiscriminately 
to other members of the general public.”105 
The court went on to state that the categories of public accommodation are 
exemplary, and not comprehensive.106  Thus, it did not matter whether the 
plaintiffs could demonstrate that Netflix matched one or more examples in any 
of the categories.  Rather, it mattered that its inclusion in any given category 
could be justified.107  Finally, the court rejected defendant’s argument that their 
streaming service was not a place of public accommodation because it was 
accessed primarily in private residences.108  The court stated that the ADA 
“covers “the services ‘of’ a public accommodation, not services ‘at’ or ‘in’ a 
public accommodation.””109  To hold otherwise would exempt such entities as 
plumbers and deliverymen from the ADA entirely.110  Finally, the most recent 
                                                 
 100. Id. at 1023–24. 
 101. Cullen v. Netflix, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1023–24 (N.D. Cal. 2012).  The court did 
not address whether there could be a nexus between Netflix’s online website and the distribution 
centers from which it mailed the DVDs it also offered as an alternative to streaming.  Id. 
 102. 869 F. Supp. 2d 196 (D. Mass. 2012). 
 103. Id. at 199. 
 104. Id. at 200.  The four categories plaintiffs referred to were “place of recreation,” “place of 
exhibition and entertainment,” “sales or rental establishment,” and “service establishment.”  Id. 
(quoting portions of 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2012)). 
 105. Id. (quoting Carparts Distrib. Ctr. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New England, 37 F.3d 
12, 20 (1st Cir. 1994)). 
 106. Id. at 201. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 201 (D. Mass. 2012). 
 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
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decision rejecting the nexus test is National Federation of the Blind v. Scribd, 
Inc.111  Scribd is an online service that provides access to more than 40 million 
books for a monthly subscription fee.112  The plaintiffs asserted that, since Scribd 
had an entirely visual interface, it was incompatible with screen readers, and 
therefore discriminated against the blind in a place of public accommodation.113  
The court ruled that the text of Section 12182 was ambiguous on its face and 
enumerated the various circuit splits ruling different ways on the question.114  In 
addition, the court found that, according to canons of statutory construction and 
legislative history, the ADA is best interpreted in a broad, liberal and 
technologically-evolving fashion.115  Although the court ruled that plaintiffs had 
a successful claim and denied Scribd’s motion to dismiss, it did not rule on 
whether Scribd fell under any of the categories of public accommodation 
described in Section 12181.116 
II. GEOGRAPHY, SPATIALITY AND THE INTERNET 
This Comment will now move from the relevant case law to the argument that 
the term “places” means more than a discrete physical location.  Before 
addressing the legal question, it is necessary to lay a philosophical foundation 
for the argument.  As demonstrated above, courts seem reluctant to examine the 
possibility of websites as places in the conventional sense of the word.  While 
the statement that websites themselves are not places in terms of physical 
locations is obvious, the idea that place as a concept is restricted only to the 
physical realm is less obvious.  This section outlines several approaches to this 
question: the first is philosophical and examines the concept of spatiality in 
particular and the Internet’s relationship to physical geography.  It is followed 
by an examination of ADA scholarship on place along with courts’ treatment of 
place in the context of trespass and search and seizure. 
A. Place, Space, and Philosophy 
Before explicating the physicality of the Internet itself, it is worth briefly 
discussing the philosophical conception of place, and whether it is justifiable to 
conceive of place as more variegated idea than simply a bounded physical 
location. 
                                                 
 111. 97 F. Supp. 3d 565 (D. Vt. 2015). 
 112. Id. at 567. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 568–71. 
 115. Id. at 573–74. 
 116. Id. at 576. 
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There are few philosophers who have investigated the idea of place.117  One 
of the most accomplished is Jeff Malpas,118 whose area of work includes 
“philosophical topography.”  Malpas analyzes the relationship between place 
and mind to arrive at an externalist conception of place.119  Far from being a 
contingent feature of human experience, place is one of the primary conceptions 
humans use to orient themselves in the world.120  “Place” is difficult to define 
because the word is used in so many ways.121  The primary sense of place is 
bound up with the concepts of dimensionality and location.122  The concept 
“place,” however, is bound up with the concept of space, whose meaning is also 
debated.  While “space” is understood exclusively in terms of physical 
                                                 
 117. Contemporary philosophers of phenomenology give particular attention to the subject—
Bachelard, Foucault, Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger perhaps being the most well-known.  See 
generally EDWARD CASEY, THE FATE OF PLACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORY (1997) (a seminal 
treatment which covers the history of place in western philosophy in exhaustive detail). 
 118. Malpas is currently a distinguished professor at the University of Tasmania in Australia.  
See generally J. E. MALPAS, PLACE AND EXPERIENCE: A PHILOSOPHICAL TOPOGRAPHY (1999). 
 119. Externalism is a theory that posits that one’s inner life at least partially comprises external 
factors, including location.  From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: 
In its most general formulation, externalism with regard to a property K is a thesis 
about how K is individuated.  It says that whether a creature has K or not depends in 
part on facts about how the creature is related to its external environment. In other 
words, it is metaphysically possible that there are two intrinsically indistinguishable 
creatures, only one of which has property K, as a result of them being situated in 
different environment.  To give a trivial example, externalism is true of mosquito bites 
since having them requires having been bitten by a mosquito. A mark on the skin 
created by careful micro-surgery is not a mosquito bite, even if it is intrinsically 
indistinguishable from a real one. 
Externalism About Mental Content, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/content-externalism/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2014). 
 120. Malpas explained: 
There is good reason to suppose that the human relationship to place is a fundamental 
structure in what makes possible the sort of life that is characteristically human, while 
also being determining, in some way that requires clarification, of human identity.  In 
that case, it is not surprising that place, and associated notions of spatiality and 
embodiment, should have come to such prominence in so many different disciplines 
and in the work of so many different writers and researchers. 
MALPAS, supra note 118, at 13. 
 121. The Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of place extends over five pages, but Malpas 
elucidates five main senses of the word: 
(i)  a definite but open space, particularly a bounded, open space within a city or town; 
(ii) a more 534eneralized sense of space, extension, dimensionality or ‘room’ (and, 
understood as identical with a certain conception of space, place may, in this sense, be 
opposed to time); (iii) location or position within some order (whether it be a spatial or 
some other kind of ordering, hierarchical or not); (iv) a particular locale or environment 
that has a character of its own; and (v) an abode or that within which something exists 
or within which it dwells. 
Id. at 19–22. 
 122. Id. at 25. 
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extension, “place” is restricted to the realm of physical location.123  Although 
Malpas does not limit the idea of place to the idea of the human experience in a 
physical location, he does argue for the integral nature of place to human 
experience itself.124 
For the purposes of this Comment, Malpas’s exploration of the objective and 
subjective dimensions of space is more important than his exploration of the 
relationship between place and mind.  If space goes beyond simply a dimension 
or “container” for various physical phenomena—as in much of modern 
philosophy125—but must also be understood in subjective appropriation, then 
there is room to consider both space and place as extending beyond the physical 
realm into areas that mediate a different idea of space.  Malpas argues that the 
human conception of space is, in part, dependent on the fact that one is related 
to objects within it.126  One cannot conceive of space apart from one’s own 
connection to other bodies within space.  In light of this basic fact, Malpas 
distinguishes between egocentric and allocentric space.  Egocentric space is 
centered on a creature’s own experience or activity, whereas allocentric space is 
centered on a particular feature of the environment.127 
These philosophical considerations matter because, if place is related to 
experience in this way, then physical location is merely a “jumping-off point” 
for understanding the conceptual realm of place; it is not a completely restrictive 
category.  Although conceptions of “place” must take into account the basic 
features of a physical location, one can do so while still incorporating websites 
into that scheme.  A key way of doing so—and a way that all humans do, all of 
the time—is through the use of metaphors. 
B. The Georgraphy of the Net and Metaphors of Place 
The Internet is not a physical location.  Neither, however, is it a free-floating 
concept totally severed from various physical concepts.  One can see this by way 
of metaphors applied to the Internet.  Dan Hunter,128 in his seminal work 
Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommunist,129 briefly 
outlined the history of metaphors surrounding cyberspace.  The Internet is a 
“frontier;” people “cross into a landscape unlike any which humanity has 
experienced before;” a “region without physical shape or form.”130  Websites are 
                                                 
 123. Id. at 27–28. 
 124. Id. at 31–32. 
 125. This includes Descartes, Newton, Kant, and Swinburne.  See id. at 28–30. 
 126. MALPAS, supra note 118, at 49. 
 127. Id. at 53. 
 128. Dan Hunter is the “Robert F. Irwin IV Term Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, 
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.”  See Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the 
Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439 (2003). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 455 n.85. 
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divided between public and private, with “walls” and “locks” that can be 
constructed or broken down.131 
Hunter draws on the interaction theory of metaphor, particularly as articulated 
by George Lakoff, to explain the relevance of metaphor to cyberspace.132  
“[I]nteraction theory . . . discusses the role that metaphor plays in structuring the 
way we think.”133  In interaction theory, the “source” of the metaphor—the 
domain from which the metaphorical features are drawn— and the target—the 
subject of the metaphor itself—interact such that cognitive information is 
transferred from source to target.134  The target and source relate to one another 
through a system of relationships, creating a new set of assumptions that cannot 
be expressed in any other way.135  Lakoff draws upon a body of empirical 
evidence to argue that humans in general have a series of common cognitive 
metaphors underlying their thinking; thus, linguistic metaphors shape the way 
we consider broader concepts.136 
Hunter argues on the basis of the ubiquity of spatial metaphors to the Internet, 
that place is a common cognitive metaphor that people will likely always apply 
to the Internet in general and websites in particular.137  Recent scholarship in the 
fields of computer science and geography has explored the significance of 
physicality to the Internet, and the various ways it effects and interacts with 
world geography.  Kellerman maps several spatial dimensions onto the Internet; 
the most relevant for our purposes are information, communications and screen 
spaces.138  When combined, the features of these spaces strongly resemble the 
                                                 
 131. Id. at 455–56. 
 132. Id. at 472. 
 133. Id. at 465. 
 134. Id. at 467. 
 135. Hunter illustrates the basics of the theory with the metaphor “man is a wolf”: 
For instance, “man is a wolf” is not about the wolf qua thing, but rather the system of 
relationships that are signaled by the presence of the word “wolf.”  When we hear the 
metaphor, we are influenced by all the commonplaces of the source system.  The source 
system selects and emphasizes some features of the target system while suppressing 
others. So we interpret “wolf” on the basis of our knowledge and “associated 
commonplaces” about wolves.  When presented with the metaphor, we are 
immediately assailed with recollections about wolves being “ferocious, territorial, and 
possessive.”  The source selects and emphasizes those “wolf-like” aspects that are 
already present in our view of man. 
Id. at 468 (internal citations omitted). 
 136. Id. at 469–70 (offering as a particular example the mapping of features of war onto legal 
and other types of arguments). 
 137. See id. at 481.  Hunter argues for policy reasons that the overuse of such a metaphor will 
have deleterious consequences of people’s rights of access online.  Hunter’s argument is powerful 
and deserves engagement; subject matter and space considerations preclude discussion of his policy 
arguments herein. 
 138. AHARON KELLERMAN, GEOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATIONS OF THE INTERNET 28 (2016). 
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conceptions of place outlined above by Malpas.139  Finally, even the non-
physical aspects of the Internet are inevitably grounded in the physical structures 
of satellites, fiber-optic cables and computers.140 
C. Various Approaches to the Question: Expansive and Narrow, Nexus and 
Storefront Tests 
Like the various circuits, the realm of legal scholarship is divided on the 
question of whether a website can be considered a place of public 
accommodation.  The majority of scholars argue along the lines of Target’s 
nexus test, with some nuancing it and reaching for something like a 
commercial/noncommercial distinction.141 
Scholarly arguments about the ADA’s jurisdiction of the Internet are 
comparatively rare, and did not appear until the early 2000s.  In the early 2000s, 
legal scholars began discussing the best ways for courts to ensure accessibility 
on the Internet.  As early as 2001, scholars were arguing for a broad application 
of Title III of the ADA to Internet websites.142  Pre-Southwest, courts and 
scholars both acknowledged that Congress likely intended to govern more than 
simply physical locations under Title III of the ADA.143  Nevertheless, the 
Internet is not identical to physical locations, and Adam Schloss144 in particular 
raised concerns about the long-term financial viability of websites governed 
under Title III.145  Michael O. Finnigan and Heather M. Lutz146 argue further 
that, on textual grounds, the statutory language of the ADA excludes Internet 
websites by default under “canon expression unius (the inclusion of some items 
                                                 
 139. Information and communications spaces constitute the realms whereby users obtain 
various pieces of data and send and receive it with other parties; the “screen-space” of the Internet 
structures these interactions in a visual way, thus combining the subjective and objective notions 
of space in a non-physical way.  Of interest is the fact that Kellerman never discusses the oral 
interface used by most blind people in the form of screen readers.  See id. §§ 2.4.1–2.4.3 (2016). 
 140. Barney Warf, Global Geographies of the Internet § 1.4 (2016).  This reality would suggest 
that the nexus test discussed above is unnecessarily narrow and fails to take into account not only 
the nonphysical spatiality of the Internet but websites unavoidably links to physical structures. 
 141. See infra for a comparison of the content/non-content distinction with a service/non-
service distinction. 
 142. Adam N. Schloss, WEB-SIGHT FOR VISUALLY-DISABLED PEOPLE: DOES TITLE III 
OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT APPLY TO INTERNET WEBSITES?, 35 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 35, 49–50 (2001). 
 143. Schloss points out several notable media not discussed in the above sections of this article, 
including correspondence courses, telephone access and mandatory closed captioning capabilities 
for televisions.  Id. at 46–48. 
 144. J.D. Columbia Law School, 2002. 
 145. Schloss proposed that Congress incentivize compliance with Title III by subsidizing 
larger websites, in hopes of increasing profitability of compliance and increasing the likelihood that 
competitors would then proceed to raise their own accessibility standards.  Schloss, supra note 142, 
at 55–57. 
 146. Contributing Members, 2006–2007 University of Cincinnati Law Review. 
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in a statute indicates the exclusion of other items not included in the statute).”147  
O’Finnigan and Lutz go on to say that Congress did not amend Title III to 
address telecommunications, thus evidencing a clear intent to excluded 
intangible access from the definition of place of public accommodation.148  
Finally in addressing Target specifically, they argue that Target’s website does 
not satisfy a nexus test.  Target is a legal corporation and not a physical entity; 
thus it is impossible for Target’s website to be linked to any particular physical 
location.149  This argument rests on shaky foundations.  Legally, while it is 
possible to distinguish a corporation itself from the physical locations it operates, 
pressing this distinction in an ADA context could easily allow corporations to 
evade responsibilities under the act by, for example, claiming that the store 
owners and managers were responsible for each location’s compliance, thus 
immunizing the corporation from any litigation. 
The approaches of Adam Schloss and Heather Lutz are not favored by all 
scholars, as courts began applying the nexus test, or something like it, to Title 
III Internet cases before them.150  Typical jurisprudence advocating the nexus 
test matched the descriptions and arguments of the courts.  The nexus test “best 
reflects the language of the ADA” and “best reflects the nature of the 
Internet.”151  The discrimination provisions of the ADA ensure that, although 
there must be a connection between the website and a physical location, the 
barriers to access need not be tangible.152  Richard Moberly argues for a broader 
                                                 
 147. Michael O. Finnigan, Jr., Brian C. Griffith, & Heather M. Lutz, ACCOMMODATING 
CYBERSPACE: APPLICATION OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT TO THE 
INTERNET, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1795, 1818 (2007). 
 148. Id. at 1820. 
 149. Id. at 1823.  This approach is similar to that in Southwest, though going farther in asserting 
that a corporation is always legally distinct from a physical location such that services offered by 
that corporation would never be governed under Section 12182 of the ADA.  Though understated, 
this is a key plank in their argument.  The nexus test is unintelligible if a distinction between a 
corporation and a physical location is made in this manner; thus leaving little if any room for the 
ADA to affect the Internet at all. 
 150. See supra pp. 12–20, regarding the discussion of Southwest and Target. 
 151. Richard E. Moberly, The Americans with Disabilities Act in Cyberspace: Applying the 
“Nexus” Approach to Private Internet Websites, 55 MERCER L. REV. 963, 978, 988 (2004). 
 152. Id. at 985–86. Thus Moberly states: 
Under the nexus approach, then, a connection must exist between a physical place of 
public accommodation and the discriminatory action or inaccessible service.  This 
connection, however, is not limited only to whether an individual with a disability can 
physically access a place of public accommodation.  By referencing discriminatory 
actions taken with regard to a broad range of activities of a public accommodation, in 
addition to the accommodation’s facilities, the statutory text indicates that the 
connection simply must be toward some aspect of the place of public accommodation’s 
offerings to the public.  The nexus can involve both tangible and intangible 
discriminatory actions, including refusing to provide auxiliary aids to ensure effective 
communication or failing to make reasonable modifications in policies or procedures 
to provide an individual with a disability full use of the goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of a place of public accommodation. 
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interpretation of the nexus test, under which courts should treat a website as “a 
means by which the public is able to enjoy the ‘goods, services, . . . privileges, 
[and] advantages’ of a physical place of public accommodation.”153  This 
approach is nearly identical to the view of the nexus test the California court 
applied in Target and has been popular with many courts since then. 
Several scholars, while favoring the nexus test, prefer to speak instead in terms 
of commercial versus noncommercial distinctions among websites.154  Scholars 
interpret this distinction in both a broad and a narrow fashion.  Trevor 
Crowley155 offers a narrow “storefront test,” which has similar language to the 
classic nexus test: 
Any website that acts as a storefront for an entity that offers a substantial 
amount of its goods or services from a physical facility may be subject to Title 
III if the facility and the website together form an entity that would otherwise 
fall under one of the enumerated places of public accommodation. 156 
Crowley differentiates his approach from the nexus test by arguing that what 
is important is (a) the physical nature of the goods or services on offer and (b) 
the link of the website to a discrete, physical location, but not (c) the symmetry 
between what a website offers for sale and what the physical location offers for 
sale.157  In fact, the physical location might not have to sell anything if the 
website itself were operating as a store.  So, for example, Netflix’s mail-order 
DVD service would be governed under Title III while it’s “watch instantly” 
streaming service would not.158 
Another popular but broader distinction is between commercial and 
noncommercial websites.  This requirement is less stringent than either a nexus 
or storefront test.159  All a website would need to do to fall under the commercial 
definition is affect interstate commerce and sell services similar enough to the 
enumerated establishments in the statute.160  A similar approach suggests that as 
                                                 
Id. at 986. 
 153. Id. at 995. 
 154. See generally Trevor Crowley, Wheelchair Ramps In Cyberspace: Bringing The 
Americans With Disabilities Act Into The 21st Century, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 651 (2013); Nikki D. 
Kessling, Why The Target “Nexus Test” Leaves Disabled Americans Disconnected: A Better 
Approach To Determine Whether Private Commercial Websites Are “Places Of Public 
Accommodation”, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 991 (2008). 
 155. “J.D. Candidate, April 2014, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 
An earlier version of this paper received the 2013 Student Paper Award from the Disabilities 
Division, Society for the Study of Social Problems (SSSP), and was presented at the SSSP 2013 
Annual Meeting.”  Crowley, supra note 155, at 651. 
 156. Id. at 652. 
 157. Id. at 686–87. 
 158. Id. at 688.  The difficulty with Crowley’s analysis on this point is that he seems to have 
failed to predict that an entity could offer goods or services through a storefront-like website that 
was nevertheless linked to no physical location.  See infra pp. 37–38. 
 159. Kessling, supra note 155, at 996–97. 
 160. Id. at 1025. 
540 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 67:521 
long as a website is linked to one of the twelve entities listed in Title III, it is 
irrelevant whether the website itself qualifies as a place.  Instead, as long as the 
website is maintained and operated from a physical location, Title III can govern 
the website.161 
The most recent argument in favor of applying the ADA to certain websites 
dispenses with the “place” defense entirely and is similar to a distinction that 
will shortly follow: namely, that of “content” on offer at a website.162  The 
procedure is as follows: 
Procedurally, the content test would follow in two parts. First, the court would 
classify the material provided by the website.  Second, once the court has 
categorized the website, it would see if what the website provides falls within 
one of the categories provided by Congress in its definition of public 
accommodation.  Take, for example, a website that sells clothing.  First, since 
the website sells clothing, the court could classify it as a clothing store or sales 
establishment.  Second, the court would then look at the categories provided by 
Congress in its definition of public accommodation.  Since “clothing store” and 
“sales establishment” are two categories included in Congress’s definition, this 
website would be a public accommodation and subject to Title III of the ADA.163 
Finally, there are arguments that the nexus, storefront and commerce tests are 
all insufficient, and that the Internet itself should be considered a place.  The 
Internet as place is captured in the metaphorical language used to describe it.  
One “surfs the web;” one can even “enter” or “leave” certain public fora, such 
as social media.  On this account, “[w]hat constitutes a place is more of a social 
construct than a matter of defining precisely what characteristics must be present 
                                                 
 161. Kenneth Kronstadt, Looking Behind the Curtain: Applying Title III of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act to the Businesses Behind Commercial Websites, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 111, 132–33 
(2007).  Kronstad’s position is subtly but importantly different from the nexus test: 
Considering a business operating a website in this manner renders obsolete theoretical 
arguments of whether the Internet itself is a place. This approach instead shifts the 
focus of the debate regarding the public accommodation provision away from what 
venues should accommodate the disabled to the types of commercial services Congress 
intended to be made available free from discrimination.  An entity providing the types 
of commercial services Congress included within the twelve categories should qualify 
as a place of public accommodation even if it serves the public solely via a website. 
The PACE approach is consistent with the language of the ADA, the purpose behind 
the ADA’s enactment, and the nature of the Internet, yet it allows the ADA to adapt to 
a changing world without disturbing the plain meaning of the word “place.” 
Id.  This approach is broader than Crowley’s, since it does not require the website to be purveying 
physical goods.  In that way, however, it strikes this writer as confused; Kronstadt would appear to 
want to have his cake and eat it too, conceiving of a website itself as wholly accidental to the 
existence of most commercial entities.  But why should the mere fact that, for example, a website 
is linked to a physical server automatically put it under the umbrella of Title III simply because it 
has a “physical” location? 
 162. Carly Schiff, Cracking the Code: Implementing Internet Accessibility Through the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 2315, 2346 (2016). 
 163. Id. 
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for a ‘place’ to exist.”164  People use websites like places; they talk about them 
like places; and websites were designed, in some sense, to be places.165  A recent 
article applying the ADA to the Internet is more concerned with administrative 
costs and benefits, but nevertheless states that the nexus test is a “stop-gap 
measure taken from physical corollaries that just does not effectively apply to 
the Internet.”166 
D. Cyberspace and Place in Legal Scholarship: Trespass and the Fourth 
Amendment as Test Cases 
A significant lacuna in prior scholarship arguing for or against the ADA’s 
application to Internet websites is the examination of other areas of 
jurisprudence to see how courts have understood the Internet generally.  
Arguments over whether the Internet is a place cannot get far relying only on the 
statutory language of the ADA and the small field of precedent the question has 
generated.  Fortunately, although courts have not held directly that the Internet 
is to be treated as a place, they have generally treated it as such by implication 
in their rulings on other questions.  In particular, this Comment examines court 
rulings on the tort of trespass and searches and seizures under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Several cases in the late 1990s and early 2000s established precedent for 
treating computer networks and websites as places or the equivalent of physical 
property through the common law tort of trespass.  The first such class of cases 
involved Internet service providers litigating over the mass sending of millions 
of emails to a server.  Bulk email must be sifted and eliminated by computer 
networks, and that can put strain on servers, increase subscriber costs, and, 
ultimately, harm the companies’ network and profit.167  In using the common 
law standards for trespass to chattel, the courts asked whether (1) the defendant 
intentionally caused a contact with the server; (2) whether the contact was 
unauthorized; and (3) whether the contact caused damage to the server.168  In 
CompuServe v. Cyber Promotions, Inc. the court held that a physical disposition 
was only one of the ways a party could commit the tort of trespass to chattel; 
other kinds of nonphysical interferences could also be trespasses.169 
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Sending mass spam email is not the only action courts had to judge when 
litigating trespass issues.  Another prominent issue was the use of electronic 
robots or aggregators to rapidly compile information from a website, usually to 
increase the competitiveness of a rival website.  In eBay, Inc. v. Bitter’s Edge, 
Inc.,170 the defendant was an auction aggregator who enlisted a “scraper” to 
obtain auction data from eBay despite eBay’s attempts to disable robots from 
using the site.171  Likewise in Register.com, Inc. v. Verio Inc.,172 the defendant 
obtained information about the plaintiff’s customers through an electronic robot 
and began sending mass emails soliciting their business.173  The court in eBay 
ruled that the actions of Bitter’s Edge were likely sufficient to cause ongoing 
harm so the court should view the action as a trespass to chattel and grant an 
injunction.174  Likewise, in Register.com, because of the strain on 
Register.com’s database and the intentional interference of plaintiff’s possession 
by the defendant, the court found that Verio’s use of a robot constituted a 
trespass to chattel.175  All of these cases indicate the courts’ general willingness 
to treat interaction with and damage to nonphysical networks as analogous to 
damage to and interference with actual physical property.  Courts have had little 
hesitation about doing so.  It is arguable that, given the legislative history set out 
above, interpreting a place of public accommodation along similar lines is even 
more justifiable.176 
Similarly, in applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet, a move such as 
treating the nonphysical Internet with physical metaphors is almost inevitable 
given the Fourth Amendment’s plain language.  The full text of the Fourth 
Amendment is as follows: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.177 
In ruling on a search-and-seizure case where the question concerned invasion 
of privacy by searching of an employee’s text message, the Supreme Court 
assumed for the sake of argument that “the principles applicable to a government 
employer’s search of an employee’s physical office apply with at least the same 
force when the employer intrudes on the employee’s privacy in the electronic 
sphere.”178  In part, this assumption was based on the fact that “rapid changes in 
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the dynamics of communication and information transmission are evident not 
just in the technology itself but in what society accepts as proper behavior.”179  
Recently, scholars have reviewed various court rulings on searching and seizing 
data across United States borders.180  In Warshak v. United States,181 the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that “e-mail is an ever-increasing mode of private 
communication, and protecting shared communications through this medium is 
as important to Fourth Amendment principles today as protecting telephone 
conversations has been in the past.”182 
Space considerations preclude an exhaustive review of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence as applied to evolving technology, but scholarship addressing this 
question is abundant.183  Instead, this Comment draws on the insights of others 
and argues that courts should use the same types of flexible standards applied to 
Fourth Amendment cases when examining cases under the ADA.  Orin Kerr 
makes the case in Applying the Fourth Amendment: A General Approach, for a 
judicial approach to the Fourth Amendment that assumes “technological 
neutrality.”184   Technology neutrality “posits that judges will interpret the 
Fourth Amendment in the online environment so that it has roughly the same 
role in new Internet crime investigations that it has established in traditional 
physical investigations.”185  Judges generally assume a neutral though cautious 
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stance towards applying the Fourth Amendment to new technology in light of 
the Supreme Court’s adoption of a pragmatic approach to the question.186 
In adopting a stance of technology neutrality, Kerr seeks to stick closely to 
principles already established in Fourth Amendment law.187  To that end, he 
advocates for the replacement of the distinction between inside and outside 
physical locations with a distinction between content and non-content media in 
an online context.188  He says that this distinction 
[C]aptures the basic function of the inside/outside distinction.  Outside 
surveillance is usually surveillance relating to identity, location, and 
time.  By watching a person in public, the police normally can learn 
where he was at a particular time and where he was going.  In contrast, 
inside surveillance more often exposes private thoughts.  By breaking 
into a person’s private spaces, the police can obtain insights into the 
contents of the person’s mind that he normally keeps to himself or only 
shares with a trusted few.  That distinction correlates reasonably 
accurately to the online distinction between content and non-content 
surveillance.  Online, non-content surveillance is usually surveillance 
related to identity, location, and time; content surveillance is 
surveillance of private thoughts and speech.189 
Surveillance of non-content items would include all of the communication 
tags and information about where the content originated and the parties to whom 
it was transmitted.190 
These assumptions—technological neutrality and the transferability of legal 
distinctions from a physical to a digital realm—apply to the ADA.  Like the 
content/non-content distinction Kerr constructs for the Fourth Amendment, this 
Comment agrees with the prior scholarship suggesting a 
commercial/noncommercial test.  The enumerated places of public 
accommodation in Section 12182 are all linked to commerce.  It is both 
relatively straightforward and intuitive to examine a particular website and 
determine if it offers such services.  However, there should be one important 
public policy caveat: “commercial” should probably not be so broad as to 
include all websites that make any money.  The vast majority of websites recoup 
money, even if in very small amounts, from advertising revenue.  Applying the 
service/non-service distinction to sites inclusive of all that receive money that 
way would mean that there is no site to which the ADA would not apply.  Much 
like how Congress was careful to delineate which public spaces must be altered 
for accessibility, a prerequisite amount of care should be required for application 
of the ADA to the Internet.  This distinction would recognize the reality of the 
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“internet of things”: that much of the service the average person relies upon is 
not linked to any particular physical facility or location.  The flagship example 
is probably Uber: a cab service coordinated entirely through a mobile 
application, with no centralized location.  Uber would, under the service/non-
service distinction, clearly fall under the transportation section of Section  
12182.  The question, then, is what standard it is best to apply. 
III. REGULATING PLACES OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION ON THE INTERNET: 
ANTICIPATING THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S NEXT STEPS 
On April 29, 2016, the Department of Justice put forward its supplemental 
notice of Advance Rulemaking, articulating standards it would use in judging 
accessibility of federal and state government websites under Title II of the 
ADA.191  Though not applicable to places of public accommodation, the overall 
purposes of the new regulations could easily fit under Title III as well.  The 
guidelines are designed to ensure that all Internet users will have equal 
unrestricted access to all governmentally-operated websites, regardless of any 
disability they might have. 192 
These newly proposed technical requirements are taken from the Web Content 
Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.0 standards, first published in 2008.193  The 
Department of Justice’s proposed regulations apply to most web content created 
by a state or local government entity.  Web content is anything displayed on a 
website, including the code used to construct it.194  Web content does not include 
the computer or mobile device on which the website is accessed or the web 
browser, such as Internet Explorer or Mozilla Firefox, that is used.195 
The WCAG standards have three levels: A, AA and AAA, with level AAA 
being the most stringent.196  The Department proposes using level AA of the 
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WCAG, which includes all of the Level A requirements, are relatively 
comprehensive, and are widely used internationally.197  WCAG 2.0 contains 
specific technical standards for website accessibility that are more detailed than 
broader performance standards, but still allow for a degree of flexibility in 
implementation.198  The Department has proposed adopting a two-year time 
limit with certain exceptions.199  Under the two-year time limit, all public entities 
would be required to have their websites conform to WCAG 2.0 Level AA 
standards within two years of publication of the new regulations.  The primary 
exception is if doing so within the time limit would fundamentally alter a service 
or place undue financial burden on the entity.  WCAG Guideline 1.2.4, 
concerning live audio content, is excluded from this timeline.  Instead, it may be 
proposed that public entities will be required to provide captioning for all live 
audio or synchronized media within three years of the publication of the 
regulations.  The term “synchronized media” is audio or video displayed at the 
same time as other web based content that is required for understanding the 
complete presentation.200 
The WCAG contain detailed checklists of how website developers can make 
their sites fully accessible.201  In large part, these involve actions such as 
ensuring alternate access to dynamic content; providing closed captioning 
wherever feasible; and allowing easy navigation with hardware other than a 
keyboard and mouse.  In other words, the guidelines are highly analogous to 
those reasonable accommodations typically imposed on a place of public 
accommodation. 
In light of all of the above, the full extension of Title III of the ADA to service 
websites is both reasonable and easily applicable.  Assuming a technologically 
neutral reading of the ADA, combined with Congress’s legislative intent, 
making Internet accessibility a matter of ADA jurisprudence is no more 
untenable than extending its requirements in other areas.  Doing so 
acknowledges society’s changing technological landscape and the increasingly 
intertwined nature of physical and electronic goods and services likely to 
continue.  It would, however, be prudent for Congress to make this application 
clear if it ever decides to amend the ADA.  Doing so would be as simple as 
indicating that a place of public accommodation is not limited to a discrete 
physical location, but also encompasses nonphysical infrastructure that 
facilitates tangible goods or services.  On this view, services such as streaming 
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television shows would count; there is little but a semantic difference from 
streaming via an iPhone and playing a video via a physical DVD. 
This Comment has argued that the ADA can and should be interpreted in a 
technologically neutral manner.  Law arises from language: to understand the 
legal concept of place, it is unwise to limit examination only to court rulings.  
Instead, one must dig deeper into the ways in which humans conceive of place 
itself.  After doing so, it becomes obvious that we speak of place in many ways 
that extend beyond the physical (even if the foundational metaphors we use 
involving place are rooted in physicality).  Not only is an extra-physical 
conception of place coherent, but courts have also used it in ruling on other 
questions, including issues involving the Internet.  In light of that fact, courts 
should extend both the average concept of place and their rulings in other areas 
of law into the realm of ADA litigation. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Thus far, legal scholarship addressing the question of websites under the ADA 
has been surprisingly narrow in its focus.  The majority of these scholars spend 
little time examining the concept of place more broadly to determine whether 
the word itself can ever connote something extra-physical.  Likewise, few 
comparisons are ever made between ADA case law and other areas of relevant 
jurisprudence that could provide important analogies for the ADA, such as 
trespass and search-and-seizure law.  The result is that courts have limited 
themselves to tests such as the nexus and storefront rules, both of which fail to 
consider evolving technology and the way the average person conceives of and 
treats the use of the Internet.  Instead of these restrictive tests—which, in light 
of the broader considerations in this Comment, seem somewhat myopic—courts 
should adopt a technologically neutral outlook toward Title III of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, and treat websites themselves as places of public 
accommodation, rather than applying a nexus or a storefront test.  The 
Department of Justice should be the primary architect of regulating website 
accessibility; rather than making ad-hoc decisions, future courts should rely 
closely on those regulations, much as they would for other sorts of public 
accommodations.  Future developments in this area seem encouraging; assuming 
the Department of Justice continues to carefully consider regulations beyond the 
2016 SANPRM, courts may gradually adapt their legal analysis to take account 
of the changing face of the Internet and its permeation of the physical and 







548 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 67:521 
 
